LIVE: Strait of Hormuz closure
The war that began Feb. 28, 2026, with coordinated U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure is not a conflict confined to foreign newscasts. Its effects reached Argentine fuel pumps in less than two weeks, are complicating the upcoming agricultural season and, at the same time, are raising the geopolitical value of Vaca Muerta. What follows is a map of the impact, question by question.
What exactly happened in the Strait of Hormuz?
The Strait of Hormuz is the only maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean. Roughly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes through it, along with about 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade—virtually all of Qatar’s production.
After the Feb. 28 attacks, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued warnings barring vessel transit and began targeting ships. On March 2, an IRGC official formally confirmed the closure of the strait to vessels from the United States, Israel and their Western allies. As of March 12, there were 21 confirmed attacks on merchant ships, according to the United Kingdom Maritime Operations center. Tanker traffic fell by about 70%, and more than 150 vessels were anchored outside the strait to avoid risk.
The closure is not absolute. Satellite tracking shows Iran continues exporting oil at volumes similar to pre-conflict levels, while China and India maintain partial transit. But for Western trade, the practical result is a shutdown.
How much oil moved through it and what alternatives exist?
By 2025, about 13 million barrels per day of crude were transiting the strait, representing roughly 31% of global seaborne oil trade, according to Kpler. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) put the figure at 20 million barrels per day in 2024 when including refined products and LNG.
Alternatives are insufficient. Saudi Arabia is redirecting crude to the Red Sea port of Yanbu via the East-West pipeline, while the United Arab Emirates is routing volumes to the port of Fujairah. Combined capacity on those routes is between 3.5 million and 5.5 million barrels per day, versus the roughly 20 million that typically pass through Hormuz. The Red Sea route also faces potential Houthi attacks.
How did oil prices react?
Sharply. Brent closed Feb. 27 at around $73 a barrel. By March 8, it had surpassed $100 for the first time in four years and reached a peak of $126 during the height of market panic. At the time of writing, Brent is trading around $103–$105 per barrel, while the U.S. benchmark WTI is near $96.
Analysts estimate the strait’s closure added about $40 per barrel as a geopolitical risk premium above what market fundamentals would justify. Without the conflict, 2026 projections pointed to Brent at around $60 per barrel.
The EIA projects Brent will remain above $95 over the next two months before falling below $80 in the third quarter of 2026. That outlook depends on the duration of the conflict.
What happened to the global LNG market?
The impact on LNG has been as severe, or more so, than on crude oil. The strait accounts for about 20% of global LNG trade, nearly all from Qatar. On March 3, QatarEnergy confirmed a production halt at its Ras Laffan complex after airstrikes on infrastructure.
The Asian LNG benchmark (JKM, Japan Korea Marker) jumped to about $25.39 per million British thermal units (MMBtu), a 68% increase in a single day. Europe’s gas benchmark (TTF, Title Transfer Facility) rose about 70% in less than 48 hours.
U.S. LNG export capacity was already near its ceiling before the conflict, limiting the ability to offset lost Persian Gulf supply. Goldman Sachs warned that a full month of disruption could push TTF and JKM toward 74 euros per megawatt-hour, a level that in 2022 triggered global demand destruction.
How much do strategic oil reserves help?
The International Energy Agency (IEA) announced the largest coordinated release of strategic reserves in history: 400 million barrels among member countries. The Trump administration, in parallel, ordered releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
The problem is scale. With global consumption around 105 million barrels per day, those 400 million barrels cover roughly four days of world demand. Compared with the strait’s normal flow—about 20 million barrels per day—they equal just 20 days of typical transit. Reserve releases can calm markets temporarily, but they do not fix a broken artery.
Why are fertilizers also at risk?
The strait is not only an energy corridor. About one-third of global fertilizer trade passes through Hormuz, including significant volumes of nitrogen, urea and phosphate inputs. Natural gas accounts for roughly 80% of urea production costs, the most widely used nitrogen fertilizer in wheat and corn. When gas prices rise or supply is disrupted, urea follows.
Between Feb. 26 and March 5, urea prices increased by $23 to $80 per ton depending on the benchmark market, or roughly 11% to 18%, according to consultancy Ingeniería en Fertilizantes (IEF). In South America, delivered urea (CFR) jumped $160 per ton in one week.
How do fertilizer prices affect Argentina’s farm sector?
Argentina imports about 50% of the fertilizers it consumes. More than 60% of imported granular urea in 2025 came from the region now affected by the conflict: Oman (16%), Turkmenistan (14.2%), Qatar (12.5%) and the United Arab Emirates (3.8%), according to the Rosario Board of Trade. Fertilizer imports exceeded $2 billion in 2025, up nearly 38% year over year.
The crisis hit at a technically favorable moment: Argentina is in harvest season, not planting. But prices set in the coming weeks will shape margins for the 2026/27 campaign, especially for wheat and corn, which account for 70% of the country’s fertilizer use. Rabobank warned that 25% to 30% of global nitrogen trade moves through the strait, along with key shares of ammonia and phosphates. Most imports occur in the second half of the year, but purchasing decisions are made in May.
What happened to gasoline and diesel prices in Argentina?
Pump prices have reflected the impact since the first week of March. The EcoGo fuel price index rose from 136.3 on Feb. 26 to 148.2 on March 16 (January 2025 = 100), an 8.67% increase in less than three weeks. YPF’s regular gasoline increased by 145 pesos in a single week, or 8.3%.
YPF CEO Horacio Marín was explicit about the company’s strategy: gradual adjustments, no price freezes, following a moving average that weighs international costs. He warned that if global prices remain elevated, pass-through to pumps will continue gradually but steadily.
According to GMA Capital, a 10% increase in fuel prices adds 0.37 percentage points to inflation, which could place March’s consumer price index near 2.8%. The effect spreads quickly through transport and logistics costs.
Does Argentina lose or gain from this crisis?
Both, depending on the timeframe. In the short term, the country gains foreign currency. January 2026 marked the fourth consecutive month with oil production above 4 million cubic meters—a level last reached in August 2025 after nearly 26 years—according to the Economy Ministry. Brent above $100 boosts export revenues. Over the longer term, Argentina’s geopolitical positioning also improves as Asian and European buyers seek stable supply outside the Persian Gulf.
But there is an immediate downside. Oil accounts for about 40% of the final fuel price, so higher crude prices feed through to pumps and then to the broader price level. Added to that is pressure on fertilizer costs, which threatens agricultural margins.
What does this mean for Argentina’s LNG projects?
This is likely the most structurally significant angle for the local energy sector. Phoenix Global Resources CEO Pablo Bizzotto said at the IEFA Latam Forum that Vaca Muerta “is an example of a state policy” and that the opportunity created by the crisis is “extraordinary.”
The logic is straightforward. If the global LNG market was already tight before the conflict—with U.S. export capacity near its ceiling—the crisis accelerates demand for new, reliable supply sources. Argentina has two active liquefaction projects. The first, Southern Energy, is led by Pan American Energy with YPF, Pampa Energía, Golar and Harbour Energy, with production expected in 2027. The second is Argentina LNG, the more ambitious project driven by YPF with ENI and XRG, aiming to secure financing and launch infrastructure tenders in 2026.
YPF announced a $6 billion investment plan for 2026, with 70% allocated to Vaca Muerta, and projects shale oil output of 215,000 barrels per day. With the Vaca Muerta Oil Sur (VMOS) pipeline and Argentina LNG, the country aims to become an export hub generating $37.5 billion annually. The Hormuz crisis does not create that opportunity, but it makes it more urgent for buyers on the other side of the world.